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REGULATING CORPORATE "SPEECH" IN PUBLIC ELECTIONS

CONGRESS has attempted to regulate the effect of corporate
spending on the democratic electoral process since the first part
of the twentieth century, when the Tillman Act of 1907 was enacted.' Since that time, Congress has continually acted to control
the deleterious effect of corporate spending in connection with federal elections.' The current limitations are embodied in section
441b of the Federal Election Campaigns Act, 3 which prohibits
corporations and labor unions from making contributions or expenditures in connection with any federal election or primary.4
However, there are two exceptions to this general prohibition.
First, the Act allows these organizations to make expenditures for
political communications addressed solely to their members and
their members' families.5 Second, and more importantly, it allows
these organizations to make expenditures for the establishment
and administration of a separate fund, segregated from their general treasuries, through which the organizations can direct their
political messages to the public.6 In establishing this fund, the organization is restricted in its solicitation of contributions to its

1. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. The Act prohibited all corporations
from making money contributions in connection with elections to federal offices, and prohibited federal banks and corporations organized under federal law from making money
contributions in connection with elections to any political office.
2. For a history of Congress' efforts, see Federal Elections Comm'n v. National
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1982); United States v. International Union
United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957).
3. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1986).
4. Id. § 441b(a). Section 441b(a) also prohibits national banks and corporations organized under the laws of Congress from making contributions or expenditures in connection with elections to any political office. "Contributions" or "expenditures" are defined by
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) as including "any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan,
advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of value. . . to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any
election."
5. Id. § 441b(b)(2)(A)&(B). The "members" of capital stock corporations who are
eligible to receive such communications are limited to stockholders and the executive or
administrative personnel of such corporation. "Executive" and "administrative personnel"
are defined as employees paid on a salary basis who have "policymaking, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities." Id. § 441b(b)(7).
6. Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C).
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members and their families, 7 and no form of coercion may be applied to their members in seeking these contributions.8 The soliciting organization must also inform its members of the political
purposes of the fund at the time of the solicitation.9 Once these

segregated funds are established, they are considered to be "political committees" under the Federal Election Campaigns Act' ° and

are

subject to organizational,

registration,

and recording

requirements."

The Supreme Court has found a tension between Congress'
attempts to regulate corporate election activity and the constitutional guarantees of the first amendment. Over thirty years ago,
Justice Douglas, dissenting vigorously in United States v. United
Auto Workers," argued that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,1 3

the predecessor of section 441b, placed unconstitutional restrictions on the first amendment rights of labor unions.1 4 Nearly
twenty years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 5
a majority of the Court ruled that a Massachusetts statute, which

prohibited corporations from making political expenditures in connection with state ballot issues, violated the first amendment.'
While the Bellotti Court did not deal directly with federal restric-

tions on corporate spending in connection with elections, Justice
White, in his dissenting opinion, remarked grimly that the majority's decision had only "reserve[d] the formal interment of the
Corrupt Practices Act and similar state statutes for another
day.' 7 Justice White's dire prediction has not yet been fulfilled;
7. Id. § 441b(b)(4). In the solicitations context, "members" of a capital stock corporation may include the corporation's regular employees as well as its "executive and
administrative personnel" for the purpose of two mail solicitations each year.
8. Id. § 441b(b)(3)(A)&(C).
9. Id. § 441b(b)(3)(B).
10. Id. § 431(4)(B).
11. Id. §§ 432-434 (detailing these requirements).
12. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
13. Labor-Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947)(amending 2 U.S.C. § 251 & 50 U.S.C. app. § 1509), repealedby Amendments to
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 490-92, 496
(1976). This Act was very similar to section 441b except that it lacked a provision for the
establishment of a separate, segregated political fund.
14. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 593 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
15. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
16. Id. at 795.
17. Id. at 821 (White, J., dissenting). A number of commentators have speculated on
the future of section 441b following Bellotti. See. e.g., Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act after First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM.
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the Court did, however, recently rule that section 441b is unconstitutional within the limited context of certain political expenditures made by the nonprofit corporation Massachusetts Citizens
for Life. 8 The impact of Bellotti as well as that of Massachusetts

Citizensfor Life on the constitutionality of section 441b remains a
matter for speculation.19
This Note will seek to explore the appropriate balance between Congress' attempts to preserve the integrity of the electoral

process by restricting corporate political activities and the Supreme Court's attempts to preserve first amendment guarantees
which may become threatened when Congress regulates such
activities.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL INTERESTS IN LIMITING CORPORATE
POLITICAL SPENDING

A.

Limiting the Effect of Aggregate Wealth on the Political
Process
One of Congress' primary concerns in regulating corporate

political activity is to prevent the undue influence of aggregated
capital on politics. 2 0 Congress feared three ways that corporate

funds could adversely affect the political process. The first effect,
and the most direct, was that large political contributions by corporations would place the elected officials, whose campaigns were
U.L. REV. 149 (1979); O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited:
Social and Political Expression and the Corporationafter First National Bank v. Bellotti,
67 GEo. L.J. 1347 (1979); Note, PoliticalSpeech, Inc.: The Bellotti Decision and Corporate PoliticalSpending, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1023 (1979); Note, Prohibitionof Corporate PoliticalExpenditures: The Effects of FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti, 1979 UTAH L.
REV.

95.

18. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986).
19. For commentaries on the constitutionality of section 441b following Massachusetts Citizens for Life, see Note, Non-profit Corporate PoliticalSpeech: FederalElection
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 63 CHI. KENT L. REV. 159 (1987);
Note, Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to Hear - Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 72 CORNELL L. REV. 159
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Right of Association]; Comment, FederalElection Law - Federal Election Commission v. MassachusettsCitizens For Life: Non-Profit CorporationExpenditures in Federal Elections, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 138 (1984); The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term - Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 199-219 (1987).

20. E. EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 2 (1968)(One of the two aims of the Tillman Act and
its successors was to destroy the influence over elections that corporations exercised
through financial contributions.).
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aided by such contributions, in the debt of those corporations. 1
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the prevention of

this danger to be a legitimate governmental interest. 2 The Court
has, however, accorded this concern less deference when Congress
attempts to regulate independent political expenditures rather
than direct campaign contributions.23
Second, restricting the mere appearance of political corruption, created by large corporate contributions in election campaigns, is itself viewed as a legitimate governmental interest because of its effect on the public confidence in the electoral

process. 24 Even if there is no proof that elected officials are actually compelled to act for the special interests of their large campaign contributors, the mere appearance of such corruption is

likely to destroy the electorate's faith in the democratic process
and to discourage participation by individuals in that system.

21. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957).
The idea is to prevent . . . the great railroad companies, the great insurance
companies, the great telephone companies, the great aggregations of wealth from
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature to . . . vote for their protection and the advancement of their interests as
against those of the public.
Id. (quoting Hearings Before House Comm. on Elections, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 12
(1906)).
22. In upholding the $1,000 contribution limit in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), the Court stated as follows:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro
quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious
practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory
one.
Id. at 26-27; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982)(acknowledging as an important state interest the desire to prevent
substantial aggregations of wealth, amassed through the advantages of the corporate form
of organization, from being converted into political "war chests" which can be used to
incur political debts from legislators).
23. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-47; Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-98 (1985)(The lack of pre-arrangement and
coordination of independent expenditures with the candidate's personal campaign reduces
the danger of corruption which is involved in direct campaign contributions.).
24. In upholding the $1,000 contribution limitation in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
stated, "Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the
appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process
of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30. See also
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at
496-97 (recognizing that preventing the appearance of corruption in the electoral process is
-a compelling governmental interest).

1988-89]

CORPORATE SPEECH IN ELECTIONS

1317

Since Congress has an interest in encouraging the participation of
citizens in the political process, it has an interest in avoiding even
the appearance of political corruption.25
Finally, a separate concern of Congress in regulating corporate political spending is that heavy corporate donations in con-

nection with federal campaigns will dominate the political marketplace of ideas, "drowning out" the ideas of individuals that lack
the capital to make them widely known. 26 Congressional desire to

equalize the relative ability of voters to make their ideas known
and thereby affect elections, regardlegs of their wealth, has generally been perceived by the Court as an impermissible end.27 There
are some indications, however, that the Court would look more
favorably on such an end if Congress were able to establish that
unbalanced corporate spending has an actual impact on the outcome of elections.28 However, such a causal connection may prove
to be difficult to establish, since the Court assumes that voters are

generally able to form independent opinions on issues and candidates regardless of the extent to which they are subjected to one-

sided advertising. 9

25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. The Court recognized that avoiding the appearance of
corruption is critical "if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent." Id. (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(1973)).
26. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957). Congress'
aim in limiting corporate expenditures was not only to "prevent the subversion of the integrity of the electoral process," but also to sustain an active individual citizenry in the functioning of a democracy free from the power of money. Id.
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49 (arguing that the first amendment's protection of
political expression cannot be varied according to a person's financial ability to engage in
it).
28. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978)(If the argument
that corporate spending places an undue influence on elections had been supported by the
record or legislative findings then the Court would have had to consider whether or not
corporate spending subverted the democratic process.). Nevertheless, the Court rejected
just such an argument, as presented by Justice White, in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 810-11
(White, J., dissenting) and in Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair Housing v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 306-08 (1981)(White, J., dissenting).
29. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92. "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with
the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments,
[and] any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced
by [a corporation] is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment." Id.
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B. Protecting Corporate Shareholders and Members of NonStock Organizations
Congress also has an interest in protecting individuals who
have paid money into a corporation or labor union from having
that money used to support political ideas or candidates to whom
they may be opposed.30 The Supreme Court has shown this interest a varying amount of deference. The desire to protect "members" of a corporation without capital stock was held to justify the
regulations of section 441b in a case where those "members" contributed money to the corporation but had no position within the
corporate decision-making structure.3 " In another case, the Court
almost denied that there is any legitimate state interest in restricting corporate political spending to protect shareholders when the
shareholders are able to pursue their own remedies within the corporate structure or through derivative shareholder suits.32 The
Court in several recent cases, while not denying the legitimacy of
Congress' interest in protecting shareholders, has downplayed its
significance when the political nature of the corporation itself
makes it likely that its members will support the focus of that
corporation's political expenditures.3 " These cases suggest that
Congress' interest in protecting the members of organizations regulated under section 441b is less compelling when mechanisms
outside of federal election campaign law act to ensure that the
political views supported by a corporation's expenditures will
match the views of its members. Such mechanisms include the
structure of corporate decision-making and the dependence of
such organizations on the popularity of their political ideas for the
source of their funds.

30. Id. at 787 (recognizing the interest in "protecting the rights of shareholders
whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation").
31. FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 206-08 (1982).
32. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794-95. "Ultimately shareholders may decide, through the
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on
public issues." Id. at 794.
33. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 495 (1985)(Contributors to politically oriented organizations "obviously like the
message they are hearing from these organizations . . . otherwise they would not part with
their money."); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 259 (1986)("The resources [MCFL] has available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace.").
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FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS INFRINGED BY LIMITATIONS

ON CORPORATE SPENDING IN CONNECTION WITH FEDERAL

ELECTIONS

A.

Freedom of Expression

The first amendment's protection of expression is broadest
when Congress attempts to restrict political expression.3 4 A
threshold question must be considered, however, before Congress'
regulation of corporate political spending can be said to infringe
on political expression. Section 441b restricts the manner in which
corporations and labor unions are able to spend money to express
their political views in candidate elections.35 It does not directly
restrict the subject matter which may be expressed, but only the
source of the money which may be used to express it. "Subject
matter" restrictions are the type of regulation which are most offensive to the first amendment.36 Regulations that only restrict the
manner of expression or acts linked to expression, on the other
hand, usually raise a lower level of first amendment scrutiny than
do those restrictions based on content.37 The Supreme Court, however, has held that the expenditure of funds in political campaigns
is so integrally linked to the communication of ideas in a modern
society that restricting expenditures necessarily restricts expression and brings the full protection of the first amendment into
effect. 38
The Court has not, however, equated political spending with
political expression in every situation. In upholding a $1,000 limit

34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). Cf. Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment
is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255 (arguing that the first amendment protects
"those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern' rather than a general
'freedom to speak' ").
35. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1986).

36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (When the alleged governmental interest involves restricting a communication because its content is thought to be harmful, the Court will not
reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the first amendment, regardless of whether or not
the communication is dependent upon the expenditure of money.).

37. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Operating on the assumption that O'Brien's burning of his draft card brought the first amendment into play, the
Court stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same

course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.

38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 19 (arguing that the expenditure of money does not
inject a non-expression element into a political communication; restricting expenditures ac-

tually reduces the quantity of expression by limiting the number of issues capable of being
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience the ideas reach).
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on individual political contributions in Buckley v. Valeo, the
Court held that political contributions are only symbolic expressions of support for a candidate which do not communicate the
underlying basis for that support; therefore, they raise a lower
level of first amendment protection than direct individual expenditures in support of the same candidate.3 9 Section 441b restricts
both contributions and expenditures, which, notably, may be subject to different levels of scrutiny.40
In evaluating the appropriateness of restrictions on corporate
political spending, it is not enough to understand how the Court
relates political expenditures to pure expression or some less protected form of symbolic expression. The nature of the first amendment freedoms threatened must also be understood. When corporate political spending is restricted, two different first amendment
freedoms are threatened. The first belongs to the corporation and
is a right to self-expression, the second belongs to the public and is
a right to hear the communications.41
The theory that corporations should have a constitutionally
protected right to engage in self-expression has limited application. Self-expression is generally viewed as being deserving of protection because it enables individuals to achieve self-realization,
while being an "integral part of the development of ideas, of
mental exploration and of the affirmation of self."42 This type of
first amendment protection does not seem appropriate for artificial
persons such as corporations, unless the corporation is utilized as
an associational mechanism through which its members can exercise their individual rights to self-expression.43

39. Id. at 20-21. Commenting on the lower level of first amendment protection accorded to contributions, the Court stated that "[w]hile contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor." Id. at 21.
40. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1986).
41. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). "[T]he Court's
decisions involving corporations in the business of communication . . . are based not only
on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its
role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas." Id.
42. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1967).
43. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978)(White, J., dissenting)(Although certain corporations formed for idealogical causes may be associational forms for achieving effective
self-expression, business corporations are not associational mechanisms for the effective
self-expression of its members except in limited business areas.); see also O'Kelley, The
ConstitutionalRights of CorporationsRevisited: Social and PoliticalExpression and the
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The component of free expression that the Court concentrated on in Bellotti, which struck down a Massachusetts statute
restricting corporate spending on state ballot issues, was the public's right to be exposed to the full extent of free political debate."
Generally, the value of communications that contribute to full and
free political debate is unquestioned, and voters are entrusted to
sort out the value of each idea placed in the political marketplace
for themselves based on its content and its source. 5 Justice White,
however, has questioned reliance on this policy when the Court is
faced with political communications sponsored by corporations.46
He has set forth two valid reasons for restricting corporate political spending even in light of the public's right to be exposed to
vigorous political debate. The first is that voters may have greater
difficulty in assessing the value of corporate political ideas than in
determining the value of ideas espoused by individuals or readily
identifiable groups of individuals.41 This difficulty results from the
fact that voters may be unable to determine the amount of support for a corporate-backed political view since the amount spent
to support the view reflects the size of the corporate treasury
rather than the number of people who support it.48 Second, Justice
White fears that the use of the aggregated wealth of corporations
to dominate the political marketplace of ideas and "drown out"
the voices of individuals will discourage individual participation in
the political process, ultimately resulting in a less robust and diverse exchange of ideas.49 Despite Justice White's arguments,
however, the Bellotti Court held that ideas placed in the political
marketplace deserve first amendment protection regardless of
their source.5 °

Corporationafter First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. L.J. 1347 (1979)(examining the
difficulty in applying constitutional principles to corporations in light of cases in which the
Supreme Court has either extended or denied constitutional protection to corporations).
See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
44. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-83. The Court frames the question to be decided as
whether protected speech, valuable to a public discussion of the issues, is inhibited, rather
than whether or not the corporation's first amendment rights were violated. Id. at 776.
45. Id. at 783, 791-92.
46. Id. at 806-12 (White, J., dissenting).

47. Id. at 810 (White, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition For Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 306-08 (1981)(White, J., dissenting).
50. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784. The Court found "no support . . . for the proposition
that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses
that protection simply because its source is a corporation." Id.
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B. Freedom of Association
A second conflict between Congress' restrictions on corporate
political spending and the first amendment occurs when restrictions on corporate spending interfere with the right of association
of the members of the corporation. While the Court seems to concentrate more on the public's right to hear corporate political
communications than on the associational rights of a corporation's
members in cases addressing the constitutionality of limits on corporate political spending,51 it has more fully developed those associational rights in cases dealing with limitations on political action
committees. 2 In cases that consider limitations on political action
committees, the Court has recognized freedom of association as
the right of individuals to make their views known by amplifying
their voices in a collective effort where otherwise their individual
voices would be faint or lost.5 3 Several justices, however, have
questioned whether PAC political expression equates to the amplification of contributors voices and is thereby entitled to the full
protection of the first amendment. Justices Marshall, Brennan,
White, and Stevens joined in the plurality opinion in California
Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,54 which
holds that just as the $1,000 limit on campaign contributions was
held to be constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo,5 5 limits on the
amount that may be contributed to PACs do not violate the rights
of their contributors. This argument is based on the fact that such
contributions constitute only symbolic speech since the end product of the PAC's expression does not reflect the reasons for the
contributor's support.5 6 Under this theory, when the organization
receiving individual contributions is not an effective mechanism
for amplifying the views of those individuals, the members' right
to associate should not supply the organization with full first

51. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
52. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470

U.S. 480 (1985)(striking down a statutory limit on PAC expenditures in Presidential elections); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)(upholding a $5,000 statutory limit on the amount that could be contributed to any multi-candidate PAC in a year).
53. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. at 494 (PAC's are mechanisms by which large numbers with modest means can join
together in organizations which serve to amplify the voices of their adherents).
54. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
55. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
56. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. at 197.
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amendment protection. Justice White has argued that business
corporations are just such an ineffective mechanism for amplifying
the political views of their members and should not benefit from
the protection of their members' right to political association.57
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF LEGISLATIVE

RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE POLITICAL SPENDING

While congressional limits on corporate spending in connection with federal elections have either avoided or withstood the
Supreme Court's scrutiny since the enactment of the Tillman Act
of 1907,58 the Court's recent decisions in Bellotti59 and in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 0 cast doubt on the continued validity of such restrictions. 6 '
A. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti
In an issue of first impression before the Supreme Court, the
Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 2 considered
the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute which prohibited
corporations from making contributions or expenditures for the
purpose of influencing elections on state ballot issues.6 3 An exception to this general prohibition allowed corporations to make contributions or expenditures in order to influence the vote on ballot
issues that "materially affect" their "property, business or assets." 64 The statute also specifically stated that no issue "solely
concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of [a] corporation."6 5 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts upheld the statute when two national banking
associations and three business corporations challenged its constitutionality in connection with their proposed expenditures to influence the adoption of an amendment to the Massachusetts Consti57. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 806 (White, J., dissenting)(corporate political expressions
are most likely to represent the views of management rather than the amalgamated views
of shareholders).
58. See supra note I and accompanying text.

59. 435 U.S. at 765.
60. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
61. See supra notes 17 & 19 and accompanying text.

62.
63.
64.
65.

435 U.S. at 767.
Id. at 768-69 n.2.
Id.
Id.
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tution which would have allowed the state to impose a graduated

income tax on individuals.66 The court found that corporations,
unlike natural persons, only have first amendment rights that arise
from and are incidental to their fourteenth amendment "due pro-

cess" rights in the corporation's property and business interests. 67
The court reasoned that because a corporation's first amendment
rights only extend to protect speech related to its property or business interests, the statute's allowance of expenditures on issues
"materially affecting" such interests placed its restrictions clearly

within constitutional parameters.6 8
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by
Justice Powell, reversed the Massachusetts court's decision, holding that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the first
amendment when applied to restrict corporate expenditures aimed
at influencing the vote on state ballot issues.6 " Justice Powell
stated that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had

framed the wrong issue when it considered the source and extent
of the first amendment rights which belong to corporations.7 0 The
Court held that the source of the expression, whether it be a corporation or a natural person, is not the critical issue; rather, the

issue is whether some expression which the first amendment was
meant to protect is being restricted. 71 The Court then stated that
the proposed corporate communication focusing on a state ballot
issue was an expression "at the heart of the First Amendment's

protection" since it involved the discussion of governmental affairs.72 Because the expression restricted by the Massachusetts

statute was entitled to full first amendment protection, the Court

66. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262
(1977).
67. Id. at 783-84, 359 N.E.2d at 1269-70.
68. Id. at 785, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
69. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795.
70. Id. at 776. The Court explained:
We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The
First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper
question therefore is not whether corporations "have" First Amendment rights
and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead,
the question must be whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.
Id.
71. Id. at 776-77. "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend on the identity of its source .
Id. at 777.
72. Id.
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held that Massachusetts must show a "compelling" state interest
to uphold its restrictions.7
The Bellotti Court derived its first amendment protection
from the public's right to hear the contested communications
rather than from the corporation's right to self-expression or the
associational rights of its members. 4 By concentrating on the
"right to hear" and not the source of the expression, the Court
gave corporate political expression essentially the same protection
as individual expression. The breadth of this theory subjected the
statute to the Court's strictest scrutiny.
Before attempting to find a compelling state interest for the
statute's restrictions, the Court glossed over the fact that, on its
face, the Massachusetts statute limited only corporate contributions and expenditures rather than supplying a "content" based
restriction.7 5 There was a strong theme in the Court's opinion
that, because of the portion of the statute which prevented individual tax issues from ever being considered as materially affecting a corporation's business interests, 76 the Massachusetts legislature had actually tried to restrict the "content" of public debate.7
This theme might have prevented a full examination of whether
restrictions on corporate expenditures merit the same constitutional scrutiny as restrictions on the content of corporate
expression.
The Court then examined the state interests behind the statute to determine if any of them met the compelling interest test.
First, the state's interest in preventing the threat of corruption
was held insufficient because the risk of corruption involved in
candidate elections was not present "in a popular vote on a public
issue."7 8 Second, the interest in equalizing the voices of various
elements of society, regardless of their wealth, was held an illegiti-

73. Id. at 786. The Court stated that "'the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling.'" Id. (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).

74. Id. at 783. The Court stated that the "First Amendment goes beyond protection
of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the

stock of information from which members of the public may draw." Id.
75. Id. at 784-86.
76.
77.

See supra text accompanying note 65.
Bellotti. 435 U.S. at 785, 793. "'[T]he legislative and judicial history of the

statute indicates ...that [the provision] was "tailor-made" to prohibit corporate campaign contributions to oppose a graduated income tax amendment.'" Id. (quoting Brief for
Appellee at 6).

78. Id. at 790.
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mate governmental goal."9 Next, the interest in preventing excessive corporate spending from disturbing the political marketplace
of ideas, while not completely discounted, was deemed insufficient
to justify the statute's restrictions." ° Finally, the interest in protecting shareholders from the use of corporate funds in furtherance of views with which they might disagree was likewise rejected.8 1 The Court argued that the statute was overbroad in this

respect, since it prohibited corporate expenditures on a referendum proposal even if the shareholders unanimously authorized the
expenditures."2 The Court also suggested that this state interest

might not be compelling since shareholders were capable of protecting their own interests through internal corporate procedures

3

and derivative shareholder suits.8 4 Finding no compelling state interest to justify the statute's restrictions on corporate political
spending in connection with state ballot issues, the Court ruled
that the statute was an unconstitutional violation of the first
amendment. 5 This decision led to Justice White's prediction that

federal restrictions on corporate spending in connection with candidate elections would fall next.
B.

8

Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc.
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens

for Life, Inc.,8 7 the Supreme Court, for the first time, held that
section 441b unconstitutionally restricts first amendment free-

79. Id. at 790-91. "'[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1975)).
80. Id. at 789. The Court stated as follows:
According to appellee, corporations are wealthy and powerful and their views
may drown out other points of view. If appellee's arguments were supported by
record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First
Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our consideration.
Id.
81. Id. at 792-95.
82. Id. at 794.
83. Id. at 794-95. "Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to
insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests." Id.
84. Id. at 795.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
87. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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doms. The Court, however, did not go so far as to declare section
441b unconstitutional in all of its many applications and thus
cause Justice White's fears to be realized.
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court held that the
publication of a "Special Election Edition" newsletter by that corporation violated the prohibitions of section 441b, but that section
441b was unconstitutional as applied to the publication of such a
newsletter. 88 Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) was a nonprofit, nonstock corporation whose purpose, as stated in its articles
of incorporation, was "[t]o foster respect for human life and to
defend the right to life of all human beings, born and unborn,
through educational, political and other forms of activities."89 The
corporation published a regular newsletter which never had a total
distribution for any one issue above six thousand copies." By contrast, 100,000 copies of the "Special Election Edition" were distributed to the general public and the corporation's "members."'"
The newsletter exhorted voters to "VOTE PRO-LIFE" and identified candidates as either supporting or opposing MCFL on three
pro-life issues.92 The newsletter also contained the photographs of
thirteen candidates with exceptional pro-life records. 93 The "Special Election Edition" was financed by the corporation's general
treasury funds. 94 On the above facts, the Court concluded that the
publication of the "Special Election Edition" violated the section
441b prohibition of the expenditure of corporate funds for the
purpose of influencing federal elections.95
The Court then examined the constitutionality of section
441b as applied to the publication of the "Special Election Edition."9 As in Beltotti, the Court defined the first amendment
value being threatened by Congress' regulation of corporate political spending as the public's right to be exposed to vigorous political debate,97 thereby avoiding the special considerations limiting

88.
89.

Id. at 241.
Id.

90. Id. at 242.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 243.
Id.
Id. at 244.

94. Id.
95.

Id. at 251.

96. Id. at 251-65.
97. Id. at 251-52. "Independent expenditures constitute expression 'at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' We must therefore determine

whether the prohibition of (section] 441b burdens political speech, and, if so, whether such
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first amendment protection when a corporation rather than an individual is the speaker.9 8 Unlike the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti,99 however, section 441b does not bar corporate political expression, since it allows corporate political expenditures to be
made through separate, segregated funds.' 00 The Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life acknowledged that the section 441 b restriction of corporate political expenditures was not absolute, but
held that it was substantial because it was capable of discouraging

protected political speech.'

This chilling effect on protected

speech was held to be sufficient to "characterize section 441b as

an infringement on First Amendment activities,"'0 2 an infringement which must be justified by "a compelling state interest" in

order to withstand a constitutional challenge. 10 3
The Court found no compelling state interest to justify
prohibiting MCFL's publication of their "Special Election Edition." The Court held that the desire to eliminate the effect of
aggregated wealth on federal elections was not compelling in that

instance. It reasoned that the use of corporate wealth in politics
must usually be protected against because that wealth does not
reflect public support for the corporation's political ideas. Instead,
it reflects the economic motivations of its investors and customers.' 04 This kind of aggregated wealth, which does not reflect public support, is capable of destroying the integrity of the political

marketplace of ideas.' 0 5 The Court held that since the funds avail-

a burden is justified by a compelling state interest." Id. (citations omitted).
98. See supra notes 42-43, 51-57 and accompanying text (detailing the limitations
on first amendment protection for corporate self-expression and associational freedom of a
corporation's members).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
100. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1986).
101. 479 U.S. at 255. "[W]hile [section] 441b does not remove all opportunities for
independent spending by organizations such as MCFL, the avenue it leaves open is more
burdensome than the one it forecloses." Id. The Court argued that smaller corporations
such as MCFL cannot easily meet the organizational and recording requirements imposed
by section 441b on separate, segregated funds. Faced with these requirements, the Court
believed some organizations would decide that contemplated political activity was "simply
not worth it." Id. The Court also argued that the section's "[rlestriction of solicitation of
contributions to 'members' vastly reduces the sources of funding for organizations with
either few or no formal members, directly limiting the ability of such organizations to
engage in core politicial speech." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 256.
104. Id. at 258.
105. Id. at 257-58. "The concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the mar-
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able to politically oriented nonprofit corporations, like MCFL, reflect those corporations' popularity in the political rather than the
economic marketplace, no such threat to the integrity of the marketplace of ideas was imposed by the use of corporate funds to
engage in political expression.10°6
The Court also held that Congress' interest in preventing organizations from using an individual's money for purposes that the
individual may not support could not justify the section 441b prohibition of MCFL's "Special Election Edition." The Court found
that while this may constitute a compelling interest when business
corporations engage in political activity it does not do so in the
case of nonstock corporations such as MCFL. °7 Contributors to
business corporations invest their funds for economic gain and do
not necessarily authorize their use for political ends. 08 Contributors to politically-oriented corporations such as MCFL, however,
fully expect their funds to be used for political purposes and therefore do not require Congress' protection. 09 In addition, if stockholders object to the manner in which the corporation uses their
funds to engage in political expression, they will be less likely to
disassociate themselves because they have an economic stake in
the corporation. 110 Contributors to nonstock corporations, on the
other hand, have no economic stake in the corporation and may
simply stop contributing to it if they become dissatisfied with its
political statements."' Thus, Congress has a lesser interest in protecting the contributors in this latter category." 2 Since the Court
found no compelling governmental interest behind section 441b's
restriction on MCFL's publication of their "Special Election Edition," it held that section 441b was an unconstitutional restriction
of first amendment protected expression.'"
ketplace of political ideas." Id. at 257.
106. Id. at 259. "Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of corruption. MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a function of its success in the economic marketplace, but
its popularity in the political marketplace." Id.
107. Id. at 260.
108. Id.
109. Id. "Individuals who contribute to [MCFL] are fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes." Id. at 260-61.
110. Id. at 260. "[S]uch individuals depend on the organization for income or for a
job, it is not enough to tell them that any unhappiness with the use of their money can be
redressed simply by leaving the corporation or the union." Id.
11l. Id. at 260-61.
112. Id. at 260.
113. Id. at 262.
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ANALYSIS

After Bellotti and Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the future effectiveness of section 441b is in jeopardy." 4 In both cases,
the Supreme Court found the source of first amendment protection for corporate political expenditures in the public's "right to
hear."" 5 The Court held that the public's right to be exposed to
open political debate protects all political communications, regardless of their source." 8 Ignoring the source of the communications
gives equal protection to the political expressions of both individuals and corporations. The Court has already held that there is no
compelling governmental interest in limiting the independent political expenditures of individuals.1 17 If corporate political expression is entitled to the same level of first amendment protection as
individual expression, then section 441b could be declared unconstitutional, at least with respect to its restrictions on independent
expenditures, if not to direct campaign contributions.
There are two approaches the Court could take which would
avoid this result. The first is that the Court could find a compelling governmental interest in restricting corporate expenditures." 8
Second, the Court could deem corporate political expenditures less
deserving of first amendment protection than political expenditures by individuals, despite the public's "right to hear."1 19 The
following analysis recommends an approach to constitutional challenges of section 441b in the future.
A.

Governmental Interests

1. Preventing Aggregated Wealth From Corrupting the
Political Process
The Court has refused to recognize Congress' desire to regulate political expenditures in a manner which would equalize the
relative ability of all members of the electorate to make them-

114. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 70-74, 97 and accompanying text.
116. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). "The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source.
... Id.
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1975). "[T]he independent expenditure
ceiling . . . fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process." Id.
118. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 141-60 and accompanying text.
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selves heard, regardless of their wealth, as a legitimate governmental interest. 2 ° On the other hand, the Court has consistently
recognized the desire to limit political expenditures in order to
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political
process as an important governnental interest. 2 ' The Supreme
Court stopped short of finding this interest to be a compelling one,

however, when it was used to justify limitations on the independent political expenditures of individuals rather than on their direct campaign contributions. x22 In the view of the Court, the risk
that elected officials would be unduly influenced by large amounts
of money spent in their support is less, when such sums are spent
independently of the personal campaigns of the candidates. 23
Congress' position that restricting independent political expenditures by business corporations will prevent corruption is reinforced by two factors. These factors may lead the Court to show
additional deference to Congress' interests. First, several members
of the Court have questioned their assumption in Buckley v.
Valeo' 24 that independent expenditures by a candidate's supporters involve less threat of corruption than direct campaign contributions. 2 Second, corporations and labor unions, unlike individuals, have special legal advantages with which to aggregate the

120. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
122. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-48 (1975).
123. Id. The Court has reached this conclusion because:
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.
The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Id. at 47.
124. 424 U.S. 1 (1975):
125. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 510-11 (1985)(White, J., dissenting). "In general . . . the reasons underlying limits on contributions equally underly limits on . . 'independent' expenditures. ...
In this realm of possible tacit understandings and implied agreements, I see no reason not
to accept the congressional judgment that so-called independent expenditures must be
closely regulated." Id.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, stated, "Although I joined the portion of
the Buckley per curiam that distinguished contributions from independent expenditures for
First Amendment purposes, I now believe that the distinction has no constitutional significance." Id. at 519. See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 270 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The distinction between contributions and independent expenditures is not a line separating black from white." Id.
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wealth they will use to make their political expenditures. 12 6 These
advantages include the fact that the shareholders of corporations
and the members of labor unions contribute portions of their
wealth to these organizations so that they can effectuate their business or representative purposes. 21 These unique means by which
such organizations are able to aggregate great wealth increases
their ability to make expenditures and buy influence with elected
officials. Because of their special abililty to aggregate wealth, such
organizations should be restricted in their political contributions.12 8 Congress seems to have provided an ideally tailored restriction on the manner in which these organizations collect funds
for political purposes through section 441b's requirement that a
segregated fund be used to collect. money used for corporate political expenditures. 29
Neither Bellotti nor Massachusetts Citizens for Life provides
a conclusive answer as to how much deference the Court will show
Congress. In Bellotti, the Court found that corporate expenditures
in connection with a ballot issue did not involve a risk of corruption.13 0 The Court held that the risk involved in candidate elections was not present in votes on state ballot issues and therefore
it did not decide what level of deference was due to the governmental interest in preventing such corruption.' 31 In Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, the Court found that Congress' interest in protecting against corruption in the political process was less than
compelling because the resources available to MCFL for making

126. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
207 (1982). The purpose of section 441b is to protect against the influence of aggregated
wealth "amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization." Id.
127. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 260 (1986). Members of the typical corporation or labor union "contribute investment
funds or union dues for economic gain, and do not necessarily authorize the use of their
money for political ends." Id.
128. In FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982), the

Court stated:
In order to prevent both actual and apparent corruption, Congress aimed a part
of its regulatory scheme at corporations. [Section 441b] reflects a legislative
judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation. . . . [W]e accept Congress' judgment that it is the
potential for such influence that demands regulation.

Id.
129.
130.
131.

2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2)(C) (1986).
See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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political expenditures were a reflection of MCFL's popularity in
the "political marketplace."' 32
Underlying the holding in Massachusetts Citizens for Life
was the idea that when elected officials are responsive to the needs
of corporate supporters who are able to accurately reflect the political views of their members, the officials are actually responding
to the needs of the public who support the political stance of that
corporation."33 This kind of responsiveness among elected officials
is more a part of a representative democracy than when officials
are responsive to the raw economic power of corporations which
do not reflect the views of their members. 3 Therefore, the Court
should recognize that the governmental interest in preventing corruption grows in importance as the organization making the political expenditures decreasingly expresses the views of its
members.' 35
If the Court continues to require a compelling governmental
interest to overcome the public's "right to hear," Congress' interest in preventing corruption should meet this burden in cases
where elected officials are likely to be influenced by the raw economic power of corporate supporters rather than by the desires of
the individuals who contribute to the corporate treasury. While
this did not appear to be the case with the nonprofit, politicallyoriented MCFL, it would appear to be the case with most business
oriented corporations. 36 Therefore, section 441b should continue
to effectively guard the political process against the corrupting influence of large expenditures by business corporations.

132.

See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.

133.

Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.

238, 259 (1986)(Groups such as MCFL do not pose the same threat of corruption as business corporations because the funds they use to make political expenditures are the result
of the popularity of their political ideas among the public.).
134. United States v. United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)(The fear of
political corruption is the fear that corporations will use their raw economic power to buy
influence with elected officials to advance their interests over those of the public.).

135.

Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.

238, 260-61 (1986). MCFL's political expenditures were constitutionally protected because
they were likely to express the views of its contributors, whose sole reason for contributing

was "because they support [the political] purposes [of MCFL]." Id.
136.

See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Massachusetts Citizens

for Life, 479 U.S. at 258 n.1 1. "While business corporations may not represent the only
organizations that pose this danger, they are by far the most prominent example of entities
that enjoy legal advantages enhancing their ability to accumulate wealth." Id.
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2. Protecting Corporate Shareholders and Members of NonStock Organizations
It appears from the holdings in Bellotti and Massachusetts
Citizens for Life that Congress does not have a compelling interest in protecting shareholders from the use of corporate treasury
funds in political activities which the corporation's shareholders do
not support. In Bellotti, the Court argued that the interest in protecting shareholders could not justify restrictions on corporate political expenditures as long as the shareholders were able to protect their own interests through the instruments of corporate
democracy and derivative shareholder suits. 137 In Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, where contributors to the non-profit corporation
had no such remedies, 138 the Court held that protection of contributors was, nevertheless, not a compelling interest because contributors to MCFL had no economic disincentive to simply disassociate themselves from the corporation. 39 The combined effect of
these decisions leaves very little room for an argument that protecting shareholders can be viewed as a compelling governmental
interest which justifies restrictions on corporate political
expenditures.
It is important to note, however, that the governmental interest in protecting shareholders "grows" as the effectiveness of the
corporation in representing the views of its shareholders declines.
When the corporation is a perfect mechanism for the political expression of the views of its shareholders there are no dissenting
shareholders to protect. When the corporation proves to be a less
effective means for expressing the views of its shareholders, however, an important governmental interest is involved. 4 While this
interest may not be as compelling as the interest in preventing
corruption, it may still serve to justify the restrictions of section
441b if the Court determines that corporate political expenditures
are not entitled to the full protection of the first amendment.

137.
138.

See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241.

139. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
140. MassachusettsCitizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61 (There was no compelling
state interest in protecting shareholders because the political nature of MCFL made it
likely that the contributors views would match the views expressed in any political expenditures made by MCFL.).
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Level of First Amendment Protection
1. The Public's "Right to Hear"

Section 441b may also withstand a constitutional challenge,
even without a justifying, compelling interest, if the Court can be
convinced that independent political expenditures merit less first
amendment protection when a corporation is the speaker. Justice
White has suggested two reasons why corporate political expressions should not receive full first amendment protection even when
such protection finds its source in the public's "right to hear." '4 1
The first reason is that the public is less capable of evaluating
the worth of ideas placed in the political marketplace by corporations than those placed there by individuals. " 2 Ideas placed in the
public forum by corporations may be financially backed by corporate treasuries. The amount of money spent on conveying those
ideas to the public also may have no connection to the number of
people subscribing to those ideas or to the fervency with which
they are held. 43 Corporations also may mask their identity behind
committee names, resulting in public confusion as to the source of
the ideas. 44 Consequently, the public may find corporate communications less valuable than individual expression placed in the
public forum. The most important reason for this is that the public is less able to discern the source of such communications, a
factor each person must consider in formulating his own opinion.145 This argument, however, seems more suited to support
stringent disclosure requirements for corporate political messages,
allowing the public to identify precisely the source of these
messages, rather than to justify a complete restriction on corpo1 46
rate political expenditures from their general treasuries.

141. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. Id.

144.

Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,

454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981). "It is true that when . . . corporations speak through committees, they often adopt seductive names that may tend to conceal the true identity of the
source." Id.
145. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978). In evaluating the merits of ideas the public must consider "the source and [the] credibility of the
advocate." Id.
146. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalitionfor Fair Housing, 454 U.S. at 298

(ceiling on contributions to political committees not justified by the need to protect voters
from political messages whose source they could not identify if disclosure requirements
suffice to protect against such danger).
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Second, restrictions on corporate political spending may be
upheld even in the face of the first amendment's protection of the
public's "right to hear" since the restrictions advance the purpose
behind providing such protection.147 The public's "right to hear"
all debates on political questions was constitutionally protected "to
assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people.' 1 48 A wellinformed public is considered essential to effect these changes,' 49
and the public will become well-informed only through its exposure to many diverse opinions and ideas rather than any one authoritative presentation of selected ideas.' 50 At this point it is important to remember that section 441b does not restrict or select
which ideas or categories of ideas may be presented to the public.
It only restricts the source of money which can be used to convey
these ideas.' 51 It prohibits the use of the general treasuries of corporations and labor unions for such purposes.' 52 The members and
management of such organizations, however, remain perfectly free
to spend their own funds to help express whatever ideas they may
153
hold.
While section 441b does not directly restrict ideas from entering the public forum, the Court seems to believe that the effect
of the section's restriction on corporate political spending is to restrict the number of ideas circulating in the political marketplace.' 54 Congress, on the other hand, operates under the belief
that restricting corporate spending will have the effect of increasing the amount and diversity of political debate. 55 This effect is
accomplished in two ways. First, the members of the corporation,
who may have been content to let the generic expression of the
corporation represent them, now will be encouraged to express

147. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789. Restrictions on corporate political spending may be
justified if "corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests." Id.
148. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
149. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
150. Id. at 270.
151. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a) & (b)(2)(C) (1986).
152. Id. § 441b(a).
153. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting).
154. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. International Union United Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 575
(1957). An important interest of Congress in restricting corporate spending is "sustaining
the active alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct
of government." Id.
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their own opinions individually. 156 Congress believes that the injection of numerous individual expressions into the political marketplace of ideas, each with its own separate nuances and insights,
rather than one large generic expression, will increase the diversity and complexity of political debate and ther6fore enhance the
value of the public's "right to hear.' 15 7 Second, a large section of
the public which had been discouraged from participating in the
political process may be encouraged to become involved again if
convinced that elected officials are responsive to their desires and
not just the desires of those with large corporate treasuries.' 58 If
this occurs, an additional influx of diverse political views will be
injected into the system and the value of the public's "right to
hear" will be further enhanced.
Section 441b does not restrict the content of speech; rather, it
restricts the source of money used to engage in political expression. The Court should be cautious of replacing Congress' conception of the effect of such restrictions on the public debate of political issues with its own conception. The Court has displayed some
willingness to accept Congress' conception of the effect of section
441b if a case arose in which the record or legislative findings
supported the existence of such an effect. 59 The Court should use
this opening to retreat from the position that the source of political expression is irrelevant to the amount of first amendment protection it merits under the theory of the public's "right to hear."
Since restrictions on corporate political spending may actually enhance the public's "right to hear," the first amendment should not
prevent such restrictions. 60 If corporate spending is likely to in-

156. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 308 (1981)

(White, J., dissenting). Restricting amalgamated political ex-

pression has the "ultimate impact" of "assurfing] that a diversity of views will be
presented
157.
enlarge[s]
governing

to the voters." Id.
Id. Introducing a diversity of views into the public forum "'facilitate[s] and
public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a selfpeople.'" Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976)).

158. Id. "Recognition that enormous contributions from a few institutional sources
can overshadow the efforts of individuals may have discouraged participation in ballot mea-

sure campaigns and undermined public confidence in the referendum process." Id. (footnote omitted).
159. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
160. Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 636 (1982).
[T]he truth-producing capacity of the marketplace of ideas is not enhanced if
some are allowed to monopolize the marketplace by wielding excessive financial
resources. Just as proponents of the free market system generally recognize the
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crease the diversity and amount of political debate, however, it
should continue to receive first amendment protection. This seems
most likely to occur when the corporation involves its individual
members in the formulation of its political expression. When this
occurs, Congress' goal of increasing the diversity of ideas in the
political marketplace by encouraging individual participation is
accomplished through the corporation's involvement in the political process. In these cases the corporation acts as a mechanism to
enhance public debate and increases the value of the public's
"right to hear" rather than detracting from it. Restrictions on corporate speech in this context should be declared unconstitutional
on the grounds that they violate the "freedom of association" of
the corporation's members.
2. Freedom of Association
Applying the above analysis, the Court should turn away
from analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions on corporate
political spending by reference to the public's "right to hear" and,
instead, focus on the associational rights of the corporations'
members.161 Not every contribution of money to an organization,
however, provides first amendment protection for that organization's political expenditures under the freedom of association theory. This protection should not arise unless the organization is actually involved in amplifying the voices of its contributors through
its political expenditures. 2 Absent a process by which effective
amplification of its members' ideas can be achieved, political expenditures by corporations should not receive first amendment
protection. 63 Section 441b's requirement that corporations set up
a separate, segregated fund for their political expenditures seems
to be an effort to enhance the value of the right of association
rather than to restrict it. Since contributors to such a fund must
be made aware of its political purpose before it can receive their

need for government policing of the competitive economic process by enforcement of antitrust laws, proponents of freedom of expression must recognize the
need for government policing of the competitive electoral process by campaign
finance laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
161. For the views of other commentators advocating a focus on the freedom of association when determining the constitutionality of restrictions on corporate political spending, see O'Kelley, supra note 17, at 1370-83; Note, Right of Association, supra note 19.
162. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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contributions, 6 4 there is an increased likelihood that the ideas espoused through the use of such funds actually will amplify the
ideas of the contributors. Such a regulation can be viewed only as
a restriction on freedom of association when the nature of the corporation itself ensures that its political speech will be an accurate
amplification of its members' views. In such a situation, an organization may be discouraged by the additional burdens of establishing such a fund from engaging in political spending which would
express its members views just as accurately as if a separate, segregated fund had been established. It is only in these situations
that the first amendment's protection of freedom of association
should be sufficient to strike down section 441b as
unconstitutional.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION TEST TO
Bellotti AND Massachusetts Citizens for Life

Examining how Bellotti and Massachusetts Citizens for Life
may have been decided if the Court had looked to the freedom of
association principle to provide protection for the corporate expenditures, instead of the public's "right to hear" principle, will
help to define the constitutional limitations of section 441b. In
Bellotti, the Court held that a Massachusetts statute could not
prohibit the intended political expenditures of several national
banks and business corporations to fund opposition to a state ballot issue, because such a restriction would violate the public's
"right to hear.' 65 Applying the freedom of association principle
would seem to dictate the opposite result. Since banks and business corporations are ineffective mechanisms for the amplification
of their members; voices on political issues, 166 section 441b's requirement of separate, segregated funds should withstand first
amendment scrutiny. This requirement would enhance the value

164. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(B) (1986).
165. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
166. Id. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
Although it is arguable that corporations make [political] expenditures because
their managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so,
there is no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the
heterogeneous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political
issues are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse
any electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a
particular corporate investment.
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of the members' right of association by ensuring that corporate
expression corresponds to their views, and protect the government's important, although not compelling, interest in restricting
corporate political expenditures.
The result in Bellotti, however, may still be defended on the
case's facts. The Bellotti Court felt that the Massachusetts statute
was intended to limit one side of the debate on the proposed individual income tax issue on the state ballot.16 7 When the intention
of a legislature is to restrict the "content" of political debate
rather than to prescribe rules governing the manner in which
money is spent to engage in such debate, the restriction will have
a constant effect on ideas of all natures and the full protection of
the first amendment should apply.1 1 8 On these grounds the Bellotti decision still could stand. In the typical case of restrictions on
the political expenditures of banks and business corporations, however, even on state ballot issues, the freedom of association principle will not cause such restrictions to be found unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, a nonprofit, politically
oriented corporation was allowed to publish a "Special Election
Edition" newsletter with funds from their general treasury, despite section 441b's prohibition, because the restriction violated
the public's right to hear. 69 Applying the freedom of association
principle to this case would result in the same holding, but perhaps, limit its scope. While politically oriented corporations are
more likely to reflect accurately the views of their members when
making political expenditures than are business corporations, 7 0
such corporations still are far from perfect mechanisms for the
exercise of the right of association. The management of such corporations decide on political expenditures, while the contributors,
who do not own stock in them, have little control over these decisions.17 ' The Court believed the political expressions of these corporations would be adequately linked to their members' political
views because the members' sole reason for contributing to the
corporation was that they supported the political view dissemi-

167. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
169. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 263-65 (1986).
170. Id. at 259-61.
171. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978)(White, J.,
dissenting).
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nated by that corporation's management.172 This is certainly a
valid observation, but its value is limited by two factors which are
reflected in the facts of Massachusetts Citizens for Life. First,
prior to publication of the "Special Election Edition," MCFL restricted its efforts to gain support for its cause to lobbying, organizing marches, letter-writing campaigns, and other similar activities.11 3 A contributor to MCFL at that point could have
expected his funds to be used for any of those purposes and yet
not authorize their use for the endorsement of political candidates.
Second, a contributor may clearly support a cause and yet oppose
a candidate who supports that cause. It is quite possible that an
individual could support a candidate's stand on a particular issue
and still oppose that candidate's election because of his or her
overall platform. Political corporations that support a particular
idea, therefore, are not reliable mechanisms for amplifying their
members' views on a particular candidate for office, and section
441b's restriction on corporate political spending in such cases
normally should be upheld. The Massachusetts Citizens for Life
decision may still stand, however, in spite of these facts. The
"Special Election Edition" clearly supported candidates because
of the candidate's "pro-life" orientation only; it did not expressly
support the candidates on their overall characters or platforms. 1 4
The contributor's to MCFL clearly would support the candidates
on this issue even if they did not otherwise identify with the candidate. The first amendment's protection of the political expenditures of corporations such as MCFL, however, should not be expanded beyond situations in which the corporation's advocacy is
based on the candidate's support for that corporation's theme. The
inefficiency of such corporations as associational mechanisms justifies section 441b's requirement of separate, segregated funds in
all other cases where such corporations seek to advocate the election of a candidate to a federal political office.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should change its first amendment focus
when examining legislative restrictions on corporate political
172.

Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61. "Individuals who contrib-

ute to [MCFL] are fully aware of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely
because they support those purposes." Id.
173. Id. at 242.
174. Id. at 243-44.
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spending from the public's "right to hear" to "freedom of association." If this is accomplished, both the weight of the governmental
interests involved and the amount of protection provided by the
first amendment will vary according to the accuracy with which
the corporate spending reflects the members' views. The greater
the likelihood that a corporation's advocacy of a candidate's election to office will match its members' support of that candidate,
the more likely congressional regulation will be found unconstitutional. Such instances, however, appear to be rare, especially when
Massachusetts Citizens for Life is given its suggested, limited effect. Section 441b, therefore, should continue to be an effective
tool for securing the integrity of the electoral process.
ADAM

P.

HALL

